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A woman uses her mobile phone to check the election results as Joe Biden’s lead increases, in Houston, Texas, U.S., 
November 6, 2020. REUTERS/Callaghan O'Hare  
As the 2020 presidential campaign ramped up in August, US intelligence agencies 
warned that Russia, China, and Iran would attempt to interfere in the elections using 
disinformation campaigns or potentially disrupting voting processes. While officials 
continue to believe that Russia should remain the primary concern, Iran stole the 
headlines this election season with a brazen email campaign, while China steadily 
expanded efforts to shape US policy. US agencies and social media companies had four 
years to prepare after the high-profile Russian onslaught of hacked material and fake 
news in 2016, and the initial evidence suggests the new policies and playbooks they 
deployed helped limit the damage in 2020.  
One scenario that worried US officials was the possibility of highly visible tactics on 
Election Day that would create distrust about the integrity of the vote, such as the 
flooding of election websites with overwhelming traffic or the shutdown of voting 
infrastructure with ransomware. Officials also warned that a close contest that took days 
to resolve could be fertile ground for foreign disinformation campaigns. But while the 
2020 contest stretched on for days, no real evidence of successful foreign disinformation 
campaigns has materialized. Quick action by US agencies to identify and publicize 
potential disinformation activities, “hunt forward” missions to build intelligence and 
offensive cyber campaigns, as well as rapid takedowns by social media companies seem 
to have helped prevent the dramatic foreign efforts observed in 2016.  
Federal agencies acted fast  
Thirteen days before the election, a surprise federal government press conference 
revealed that Russia and Iran had both obtained US voter registration information, 
possibly from publicly available sources. While Russian usage was reported to be 
narrowly localized in its targets, Iran used the data to send barrages of spoofed emails to 
sow chaos. The emails warned Democratic voters in Florida, Alaska, and elsewhere that 
“we will come after you” if they did not vote for President Trump. The threatening 
messages claimed to be from the far-right group called the Proud Boys. While Director 
of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe argued that “these actions are desperate attempts 
by desperate adversaries,” FBI Director Chris Wray insisted that claims online that 
question the voting process should be met with “a healthy dose of skepticism.”  
The National Security Agency had been watching the Iranians for a while, which allowed 
for rapid attribution and a public release on their tactics. A joint cybersecurity advisory 
provided technical details on how the Iranians responsible for the intimidating emails 
obtained voter registration data by scanning state election websites with widely-used 
tools and advanced open source queries while attempting intrusion methods. Access in 
one state, namely Alaska, involved an abuse of a misconfiguration that made the website 
available, but did not constitute a direct compromise of the site. The advisory gave 
mitigation recommendations for organizations to effectively detect and block further 
attempts to steal voter files.  
Taking the fight abroad 
US Cyber Command took the response further, conducting a covert cyber operation 
against the hackers working for the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the 
Russian state-run group Dragonfly. Cyber Command uses its global reach to search for 
disinformation or hacking operations that are underway and conducts pre-emptive 
strikes to stop them. Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of the 
Cyber Command General Paul Nakasone was “very confident in actions” over the past 
several weeks to ensure adversaries were not going to interfere in the election. Cyber 
Command also expanded overseas missions over the past two years, sending teams to 
Europe to monitor the Russians, and to the Middle East and Asia to find Iranian and 
Chinese hackers on partner networks. During these hunt forward missions, the teams 
tried to identify the tools foreign adversaries use to break into computer networks, and 
then these findings were used to help defend critical networks and update antivirus 
products to better protect users.  
The malicious software uncovered by Cyber Command during these overseas missions 
was used by other government agencies to help state and local officials shore up election 
system defenses. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) also 
helped election officials from roughly 8,800 voting precincts find and fix security gaps 
in vote- registration, tallying, and reporting systems. CISA encouraged them to patch 
systems to reduce entry points, configure firewalls to block data, and limit applications 
to prevent malicious software from running and spreading throughout a network. After 
the election, CISA director Christopher Krebs reported that “we have no evidence any 
foreign adversary was capable of preventing Americans from voting or changing vote 
tallies,” suggesting that these steps might have deterred adversary access or interference 
by making it simply too hard.  
In addition, US Cyber Command hacked command and control servers for the Russian- 
speaking TrickBot criminal operation and temporarily cut off access to thousands of 
infected computers used for global ransomware attacks. In a parallel takedown effort, 
Microsoft had seen TrickBot surveillance capabilities that would allow determination of 
which infected computers belonged to election officials and lock them. The connection 
of TrickBot operators to the Kremlin is questionable, but nonetheless the first publicly 
confirmed US military actions against cybercriminals sent a signal that interference will 
not be tolerated. Another warning of potential punishment was the recent indictment of 
Sandworm, a hacker team affiliated with Russian military intelligence and responsible 
for worldwide disruptive cyberattacks, including on the 2017 French presidential 
election.  
Emphasis on rapid takedowns  
US officials were on alert for disinformation spreading on social media as the votes were 
tallied. False narratives discrediting the election processes and outcomes could be more 
damaging than cyberattacks. Officials were also quick too act. When fake Twitter 
accounts impersonating the Associated Press attempted to call election results 
prematurely, the CISA director immediately tweeted “Don’t fall for it!” linking to an 
agency guide that says, “malicious actors can use fake personas and impersonate real 
accounts.” Twitter permanently suspended the accounts in question.  
Facebook was prepared with “break glass” options to prevent election unrest, to include 
suppressing inflammatory posts. The social media giant employed them not against 
foreign entities, but a domestic group called “Stop the Steal” that was organizing 
protests of vote counts across the country. Facebook removed the group, of more than 
361,000 members, over calls for violence—although the platform has not been able to 
eliminate widespread use of the hashtag.  
Foreign action dwarfed by domestic misinformation 
Overall, foreign disinformation campaigns appeared to be smaller in reach and impact 
than in 2016. Researchers at the Election Integrity Partnership—which includes the 
Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab—found limited activity by Russian 
trolls. They report in 2020 that assets linked to the Russian Internet Research Agency 
promoted unverified claims of massive ballot tampering with hyper-partisan headlines. 
The false information was shared by US citizens and spread across fringe social media 
sites visited by right-wing groups. This election cycle, Russian seemed to rely on state-
controlled news outlets to push rhetoric on voter fraud, while boosting President 
Trump’s vocal claims of a rigged election. A Russia Today headline read “Ohio county 
elections board confirms mailing 50,000 WRONG BALLOTS, denies Trump’s ‘rigged’ 
race claim.”  
While seemingly unable to reproduce their massive disinformation campaign from 
2016, the Kremlin saw the US election as a chance to cast Western democracy as prone 
to chaos on Russian state television in order to discredit liberal ideas in their own 
country.  
Meanwhile in China, state media and commentariat followed the same pattern, 
lambasting democracy in the face of potential violence and court battles. In Hong Kong, 
newspapers seized on election turmoil as evidence of hypocrisy by Washington.  
Thanks to the efforts of US agencies, the chaotic aftermath of the presidential election 
saw no massively successful foreign interference campaigns. But President Trump’s 
continued baseless claims of voter fraud did achieve the erosion of trust in the voting 
process that many of these foreign adversaries were hoping for. The lessons of 2016 
seem to have been heeded by those looking to protect us from disinformation from 
abroad, but the real threat in 2020 came from misinformation within the United States.  
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